"Whether
we live in Spain or Scotland, Dublin or
Dresden, we all want the same things from
money, whichever currency we use: we need
to know that it will buy as much tomorrow
as it does today, we need to know that
it will be inexpensive to borrow, and we
need to know that the cost of borrowing
it will be stable over time-measures that
sterling has not done too well at over
the last fifty years."
The
seemingly ubiquitous question of whether
Britain should join the euro, asked on
so many front pages, web pages and broadcasts,
appears to have been hijacked by the
various pro and anti euro factions. Media
territory is being staked out in advance
of the mythical referendum, and all we—the
public—get to hear is impassioned rhetoric
masquerading as news.
Take
the loaded headline "Should
we scrap the pound?" Put like
this the euro question sounds emotive:
our sympathies are invoked, our
consciences stirred. Scrap
the pound? Trash our national
currency—the most poignant symbol
of our economic sovereignty? It
sounds so brutal, so callous—and
so ridiculous. We should not be
fooled. This is a rhetorical device,
deliberately employed to protect
the interests of those who stand
to profit if Britain stays out.
Did we scrap the other kind
of pound, the kind with ounces?
No, we adopted kilos and grams
instead. Things still weigh the
same, we just use a different measure.
Another example, this time from
the other side: "Should British
citizens be allowed to enjoy the
benefits of the single European
currency?" Good grief! Perhaps
they would like to "find out"
whether we would like a house in
Monte Carlo while they're at it.
We
should, by now, be familiar with
these cheap tricks. The idiotic
yes-or-no answers we are coerced
into giving depend on how the questions
are phrased. Just like everything
else, there is good and bad in
monetary union.
So how are we to answer the question: Should
Britain join the euro?
The American baseball commentator
Yogi Berra once remarked: "It's tough
to make predictions, especially about the future."
And it is precisely because we can't
predict the future, despite the best efforts
of our high-tech prophets, that British angst
over the euro is at such fever pitch. Compounding
this problem is the fact that the level of
debate in Britain is such that hardly anyone
knows anything about the issues involved. Who,
for instance, can list the government's controversial
five
economic tests? Who can say whether they
would gain or lose under the euro? Worst of
all though, and why we are bound to make poor
decisions on this matter, is our usual, shameful,
British mistrust of all things foreign—especially
the european kind of foreign.
Given this combination of ignarance
and prejudice, it seems that a euro-referendum,
if it ever comes, will ultimately be decided
by our hopes and fears, our uncertain principles,
and what little plus and minus we can see in
the thing. In other words, a hunch—not
a great basis on which to decide anything.
In which case, holding a referendum seems foolish
to say the least. If our best and brightest
can't say what is in the nation's interests,
how can a plebiscite do any better? Why should
the hunches of an ignorant public trump the
learned opinions of those who do almost nothing
else but study this stuff? Perhaps the euro
is not really an economic question after all,
as many of the pundits have been saying all
along. Perhaps it is a political one—not
least a question of political squeamishness
on the part of our leaders.
On the other hand, if the advantages or disadvantages
of joining can be calculated, then the choice
becomes a pragmatic one and we—the
Great Unwashed—need
not be consulted. Indeed, in such circumstances
our opinion should not be sought. This is precisely
what over-paid experts are for. We might fail
to understand the issues and choose the poorer
road.
There is, or soon will be, a couple of useful
indications as to whether British skepticism
over Europe has served any purpose: nearly
three hundred million Europeans are now spending
their new money. It will be interesting to
discover how many of them regret the changeover.
(2004 note: 450 million
now, with very few complaints) And is
all well in the State of Denmark, which, like
Britain opted out of the euro? It seems some
Danes are now feeling that they may have made
a mistake, and a new referendum is likely to
be called in order to find out. Sweden is also
planning to hold a referendum on the euro in
the near future. (2004
note: both Sweden and Denmark rejected membership
of the euro by slim margins last year)
But whatever the situation on the continent,
Britain—always
the reluctant European—will,
predictably, be the last aboard. If only we
could get over our schoolyard xenophobia, we
might learn a lot from our friends on the Continent.
A final thought: Whether we live in Spain or
Scotland, Dublin or Dresden, we all want the
same things from money, whichever currency
we use: we need to know that it will buy as
much tomorrow as it does today; we need to
know that it will be inexpensive to borrow;
and we need to know that the cost of borrowing
it will be stable over time—measures that sterling
has not done too well at over the last fifty
years. In other words, never mind the referendum;
the vote that counts will be the one we make
with our wallets. If it pays to conduct our
business in euros, we will.
