science

Ian McEwan

Introduction to What We Believe but Cannot Prove, (ed. John Brockman), Simon & Schuster, London, 2005

 

Proof, whether in science, philosophy, the criminal courts or daily life, is an elastic concept, interestingly beset with all kinds of human weakness, as well as ingenuity. When jealous Othello demands proof that his young wife is deceiving him, (when of course, she is pure) it is not difficult for Iago to give his master exactly what he masochistically craves. For centuries, brilliant Christian scholars demonstrated by rational argument the existence of a sky-god, even while they knew they could permit themselves no other conclusion. The mother wrongly jailed for the murder of her children, on the expert evidence of a paediatrician, reasonably questions the faith of the courts in scientific proof concerning sudden infant death syndrome. When Penelope is uncertain whether the shaggy stranger who turns up in Ithaca really is her husband Ulysses, she devises a proof invoking the construction of their nuptial bed which would satisfy most of us, but not many logicians. The precocious 10-year-old mathematician who exults in the proof that the angles of a triangle always add up to 180° will discover before his first shave that in other mathematical schemes this is not always so. Very few of us know how to demonstrate that two plus two equals four in all circumstances. But we hold it to be true, unless we are unlucky enough to live under a political dispensation that requires us to believe the impossible; George Orwell in fiction, as well as Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot and various others in fact, have shown us how the answer can be five.

It has been surprisingly difficult to establish definitively what the truth is about any matter, however simple. It is always hard to get a grasp of one's own innate assumptions, and it was once perilous to challenge the wisdom of the elders, or the traditions that have survived the centuries, and dangerous to incur the anger of the gods, or at least, of their earthly representatives. Perhaps it was the greatest invention of all, greater than that of the wheel or agriculture, this slow elaboration of a thought system, science, that has disproof at its heart and self-correction as its essential procedure. Only recently, over this past half-millennium, has some significant part of humankind begun to dispense with the kinds of insights supposedly revealed by supernatural entities, and to support instead a vast and disparate mental enterprise that works by accretion, dispute, refinement and occasional radical challenges. There are no sacred texts—in fact, a form of blasphemy has turned out to be useful. Empirical observation and proof are, of course, vitally important, but some science is little more than accurate description and classification; some ideas take hold, not because they are proved, but because they are consonant with what is known already across different fields of study, or because they turn out to predict or retrodict phenomena efficiently, or because persuasive persons with powers of patronage hold them—naturally, human frailty is well represented in science. But the ambition of juniors and an adversarial method, as well as mortality itself are mighty forces. As one commentator has noted, science proceeds by funerals.

And again, some science appears true because it is elegant—it is economically formulated, while seeming to explain a great deal. Despite fulmination against it from the pulpit, Darwin's theory of natural selection gained rapid acceptance, at least by the standards of Victorian intellectual life. His proof was really an overwhelming set of examples, laid out with exacting care. A relatively simple idea made sense across a huge variety of cases and circumstances, a fact not lost on an army of Anglican vicars in country livings, who devoted their copious free time to natural history. Einstein's novel description, in his theory of general relativity, of gravitation as a consequence, not of the attraction between bodies according to their mass, but of the curvature of space-time generated by matter and energy, was enshrined in textbooks within a few years of its formulation. Steven Weinberg describes how, from 1919 onwards, various expeditions by astronomers set out to test the theory by measuring the deflection of starlight by the sun during an eclipse. Not until the availability of radio telescopy in the early 50s were the measurements accurate enough to provide verification. For 40 years, despite a paucity of evidence, the theory was generally accepted because, in Weinberg's phrase, it was "compellingly beautiful."

Much has been written about the imagination in science, of wild hunches born out, of sudden intuitive connections, and benign promptings from mundane events (let no one forget the structure of benzene and of Kekule's dream of a snake eating its tail) and of the occasional triumph of beauty over truth. In James Watson's account, when Rosalind Franklin stood before the final model of the DNA molecule, she "accepted the fact that the structure was too pretty not to be true." Nevertheless, the idea still holds firm among us laypeople that scientists do not believe what they cannot prove. At the very least, we demand of them higher standards of evidence than we expect from literary critics, journalists or priests. It is for this reason that the 2005 Edge question—what do you believe that you cannot prove?—has generated so much public interest, for there appears to be a paradox here: those who stake their intellectual credibility on rigorous proof are lining up to declare their various unfalsifiable beliefs. Should not skepticism be the kissing cousin of science? Those very men and women who castigated us for our insistence on some cloudy notion that was not subject to the holy Trinity of blind, controlled and randomised testing, are at last bending the knee to declare their faith.

The paradox, however, is false. As the Nobel laureate Leon Lederman writes in his reply: "to believe something while knowing it cannot be proved (yet) is the essence of physics." This collection, mostly written by working scientists, does not represent the antithesis of science. These are not simply the unbuttoned musings of professionals on their day off. The contributions, ranging across many disparate fields, expressed the spirit of a scientific consciousness at its best—informed guesswork that is open-minded, free ranging, intellectually playful. Many replies offer versions of the future in various fields of study. Those readers educated in the humanities, accustomed to the pessimism that is generally supposed to be the mark of a true intellectual, will be struck by the optimistic tone of these pages. Some, like the psychologist Martin Seligman, believe we are not rotten to the core. Others even seem to think that the human lot could improve. Generally evident in these pages is an unadorned pleasure in curiosity. Is there life, or intelligent life, beyond the earth? Does time really exist? Is language a precondition of consciousness? Are cockroaches conscious? Is there a theory beyond quantum mechanics? Or indeed, do we gain a selective advantage from believing things we cannot prove? The reader will find here a collective expression of wonder at the living and inanimate world which does not have an obvious equivalent in, say, cultural studies. In the arts, perhaps lyric poetry would be a kind of happy parallel.

Another interesting feature is the prevalence here of what E. O. Wilson calls "consilience." The boundaries between different specialised subjects begin to break down when scientists find they need to draw on insights or procedures in fields of study adjacent or useful to their own. The old Enlightenment dream of a unified body of knowledge comes a little closer when biologists and economists draw on each other's concepts; neuroscientists need mathematicians, molecular biologists strayed into the poorly defended territories of chemists and physicists. Even cosmologists have drawn on evolutionary theory. And everyone, of course, needs sophisticated computing. To address each other across their disciplines, scientists have had to abandon their specialised vocabularies and adopt a lingua franca—common English. The accidental beneficiary, of course, has been the common reader, who needs no acquaintance with arcane jargon to follow the exchanges. One consequence—and perhaps symbol—of this emerging synthesis has been the Edge website and its peculiarly heady intellectual culture. These pages represent only a small part of an ongoing and thrilling colloquium that is open to all.

 

Ian McEwan's website
Listen to Ian McEwan talking about science here (Guardian)

 


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